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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case concerns an appeal of an administrative citation issued by the Kootenai County 
Building and Planning Department (hereinafter referred to as "the Department") for a violation 
of the Kootenai County Site Disturbance Ordinance on real property owned by Dr. Douglas 
Stafford and Michelle Stafford (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Stafford" or individually 
as "Dr. Stafford" and "Ms. Stafford," respectively), the Appellants in this appeal. The issuance 
of this citation was upheld in an administrative appeal to the Kootenai County Board of 
Commissioners, the Respondents in this appeal (hereinafter referred to as "the Board"). 
B. Concise Statement of Facts 
Stafford owns the property which is the subject of this appeal and of the underlying code 
violation, Code Violation No. CV07-0092 (hereinafter referred to as "the subject property"). 
The subject property is located at 2707 E. Mockingbird Loop, Harrison, Idaho 83833, and is 
legally described as Lots 15 and 16, Block 1, Amended Plat of Coeur d'Alene Lake Estates, 
according to the plat recorded at Book "G" of Plats, Page 479A, Records of Kootenai County, 
Idaho. This property has been assigned Parcel Number 01450001015A by the Kootenai County 
Assessor. A.R. p. 5-8,629. 1 
I References to the agency record prepared by the County in this matter (Case Nos. APP08-0002 and CV07-0092) 
for the Petition for Judicial Review in the District Court will use the abbreviation "A.R." (See R. p. 154.) 
References to the clerk's record prepared for this appeal will use the standard abbreviation "R." References to the 
transcript of the hearings held before the Kootenai County Hearing Examiner and the Board of Commissioners will 
use the abbreviation "Tr." (See id.) 
A building permit was issued to the subject property on July 27, 1999 (Permit No. 
30796). The site plan submitted with the Application for Permit No. 30796 showed that there 
was fifty feet (50') from the deck on the house to the ordinary high water mark of Lake Coeur 
d'Alene. A condition of that permit specifically addressed the placement ofa Orassy Infiltration 
Area (OIA) on the property by stating that "Lake City Engineering need[s] to move [the] OIA 
out of [the] 25 foot buffer zone." The single family residence for Permit No. 30796 was issued a 
Certificate of Occupancy on March 23, 2000, and the financial guarantee posted by the property 
owner was refunded on June 7,2000. A.R. p. 28-45. 
The reference to the "25 foot buffer zone" referred to the requirement of Section 8(B) of 
the Kootenai County Site Disturbance Ordinance that all owners of property along the shorelines 
of certain lakes and rivers in Kootenai County, including Coeur d'Alene Lake, retain an 
undisturbed natural vegetation buffer (also hereinafter referred to as the "no-disturbance zone") 
of at least twenty-five feet (25') in slope distance from that lake or river's ordinary high water 
mark (OHWM). A.R. p. 920, 928, 940, 949, 961, 969-70. This requirement has been 
continuously in effect since the first Site Disturbance Ordinance, Ordinance No. 251, was 
adopted on October 15, 1996. Jd. 
A building permit for an addition and/or alteration to the previously approved single 
family residence was issued on July 25, 2006 (Permit No. 40613). The site plan and the Site 
Disturbance Plan submitted with that application both show a fifty foot (50') setback from the 
OHWM of Lake Coeur d'Alene. These plans did not depict any development or activity 
completely within twenty-five feet (25') of the OHWM. A.R. p. 67-77. 
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A photograph taken by Kootenai County Assessor's Office staff in 2000, approximately 
four months after the Certificate of Occupancy was issued in conjunction with Permit No. 30796, 
showed that there was still natural vegetation existing within the no-disturbance zone, consistent 
with County approvals and the application materials provided by the owner at that time. A.R. p. 
9- 10. A photograph taken by Assessor's Office staff on July I 1,200 I, however, showed that site 
disturbance work was ongoing within the no-disturbance zone even though no application for a 
site disturbance permit for such activities had been submitted. A.R. p. 11-12. Photographs taken 
by Assessor's Office staff on July 17, 2002 show that both a manicured lawn and a rock 
bulkhead had been placed within the no-disturbance zone in a manner inconsistent with the site 
plans submitted and approved for Permit Nos. 30796 and 406 13, and in violation of Section 8(B) 
of the Site Disturbance Ordinance. A.R. p. I 2A -20. Photographs of the subject property taken 
by Department staff on August 28, 2007 and August 29, 2007 show that an unpermitted 
waterfall, manicured lawn, bulkhead, swales, sand and boulders had all been placed within the 
no-disturbance zone. A.R. p. 20-27. The condition of the subject property has not materially 
changed since that time. Tr. p. 25-35, 57-70, 80-86. 
C. Course of Proceedings 
On August 29, 2007, the Department issued a Notice of Site Disturbance Ordinance 
Violation for a violation of the no-disturbance zone. A.R. p. 5-6. After this Notice of Violation 
was issued, there were discussion and correspondence between Stafford's representatives and the 
Department concerning whether a remediation plan to return the no-disturbance zone to a natural 
state was necessary, and concerning what such a plan would require. A.R. p. 100-26. Because 
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there was an active code violation on the property, the Department would not issue Stafford a 
Certificate of Occupancy for the addition constructed pursuant to Permit No. 40613 until a 
remediation plan for the no-disturbance zone was approved. See A.R. p. 113-41. 
The Department mailed a second Notice of Site Disturbance Ordinance Violation letter to 
Stafford on March 19, 2008. This notice stated that Stafford had thirty (30) days to appeal the 
violation, and absent an appeal, had forty-five (45) days to resolve the violation. A.R. p. 127-32. 
On March 21, 2008, John Magnuson, legal counsel for Stafford, submitted an appeal of the 
March 19,2008 Notice of Violation. A.R. p. 138. 
An appeal hearing was held before Kootenai County Hearing Examiner Lisa Key on 
October 2, 2008. A.R. p. 317-22; Tr. p. 1-36. At that appeal hearing, Ms. Key received 
testimony and evidence from Mr. Magnuson, Dr. Stafford, and from Building and Planning 
Department staff. A.R. p. 200-316, 328-92, 394-467; Tr. p. 3-35. Ms. Key issued a decision 
affirming the Department's issuance of the Notice of Violation on October 15, 2008, though she 
did recommend that a rescheduling fee in the amount of $240 be refunded. A.R. p. 468-83. 
The Kootenai County Board of Commissioners (hereinafter referred to as the "Board") 
held an appeal hearing on this matter on February 12, 2009. A.R. p. 586-91; Tr. p. 37-99. At 
that appeal hearing, the Board received testimony and evidence from Mr. Magnuson, Dr. 
Stafford, Ms. Stafford, and from Building and Planning Department staff. A.R. p. 596-610; Tr. 
p. 38-70, 75-89. Bret Bowers and Greg Delevan were given the opportunity to explain why they 
were "affected persons," but were not allowed to testify to the merits of the appeal. Tr. p. 70-74. 
4 
After hearing testimony and receiving evidence, the Board conducted deliberations on the 
appeal. Tr. p. 90-98. The Board found that the testimony and evidence showed that there had 
been disturbances dating back to 2001 within the no-disturbance zone required under Section 
8(B) of Ordinance No. 283, the Site Disturbance Ordinance in effect at that time. The Board 
further found that the state of this buffer was an ongoing violation of the provisions of the Site 
Disturbance Ordinance as set forth in both Ordinance No. 283 and Ordinance No. 374 (and 
which was originally set forth in Ordinance No. 25 I). The Board also found that the work 
performed within the no-disturbance zone did not predate the enactment of Ordinance No. 251, 
which was when the no-disturbance zone was first established. The Board concurred with the 
Hearing Examiner's analysis of the meaning of the term "supersede," which concluded that it 
was intended to be synonymous with the term "replace," but was not intended to be interpreted 
to mean "render null and void." A.R. p. 622-23; Tr. p. 90-96. 
The Board required Stafford to have a design professional prepare a plan for the 
remediation of the no-disturbance zone, which would be subject to approval by the Department. 
The work set forth in the plan was then to be completed as weather and lake level conditions 
permitted. A.R. p. 623; Tr. p. 97. The Board did specifically allow the barbeque pit straddling 
the boundary of the no-disturbance zone to remain, since it had been depicted on plans 
previously approved by the Department. A.R. p. 623; Tr. p. 92-93, 97. The Board also 
concurred with the Hearing Examiner's recommendation that the $240.00 rescheduling fee be 
refunded to Stafford. A.R. p. 623-24; Tr. p. 90-91, 97. 
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The Board issued a written Order of Decision affirming the Department's issuance of the 
Notice of Violation on March 19,2009. A.R. p. 616-24; Tr. p. 100-03. The Board issued an 
Amended Order of Decision changing the timeline for compliance on April 16, 2009. A.R. p. 
742-50; Tr. p. 104-08. Stafford timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the Board's 
decision on March 27, 2009, and filed a First Amended Petition for Judicial Review on April 24, 
2009. A.R. p. 722-32, 751-6l. On December 2,2009, the District Court entered a Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Appeal which affirmed the Board's Amended Order of Decision. R. p. 
130-47. Stafford then timely filed this appeal on January 13,2010. R. p. 148-5l. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL 
A. Whether any substantial rights were prejudiced by the Board's decision in Case 
No. APP08-0002. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review of a decision of a local governing board pursuant to the Local 
Land Use Planning Act, Title 67, Chapter 65, Idaho Code (LLUPA), on appeal from a decision 
of the District Court on a petition for judicial review of the local governing board's decision, has 
been recently set forth by this Court as follows: 
In an appeal from district court, where the court was acting in its appellate 
capacity ... , the Supreme Court reviews the agency record independently of the 
district court's decision. As to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, this 
Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning agency. The Court 
defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and the 
agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even when 
there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are 
supported by evidence in the record. Planning and zoning decisions are entitled to 
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a strong presumption of validity, including the agency's application and 
interpretation of its own zoning ordinances. 
The Court shall affirm the zoning agency's action unless the Court finds that the 
agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (a) in excess of 
constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the 
agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial 
evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion. The party attacking the agency's action must first illustrate that it erred 
in the manner specified therein and must then show that a substantial right of the 
party has been prejudiced. 
Neighbors/or a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 126, 176 P.3d 126, 131 
(2007) (citations omitted). On the other hand, this Court exercises free review of decisions 
regarding the application of estoppel because such decisions generally involve mixed questions 
of law and fact which primarily present questions of law. Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807, 812, 
186 P.3d 663, 668 (2008). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court correctly held that the decision of the Kootenai County Board of 
Commissioners in Case No. APP08-0002 was not in violation of constitutional or 
statutory provisions, or provisions of county ordinance. 
I. The conduct at issue constitutes an ongoing violation of Section 8(B) of the Site 
Disturbance Ordinance then in effect from the summer of2001 to date. 
Article XII, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code § 67-6518 authorize the 
enactment of ordinances setting development standards in a variety of areas, including standards 
for site disturbances and storm water control. The first Kootenai County Site Disturbance 
Ordinance, Ordinance No. 251, was adopted on October 15, 1996. A.R. p. 958-78. Ordinance 
No. 283, which replaced Ordinance No. 251, was adopted on July 21, 1999. A.R. p. 937-57. 
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Ordinance No. 374, which replaced Ordinance No. 283, was adopted on December 8, 2005. 
A.R. p. 917-36. Section 8(B) of Ordinance No. 251 reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Waterfront Lots For lots with frontage on a recognized lake or the Coeur d'Alene 
or Spokane Rivers, an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall be retained at 
the waterfront. A stairway or walkway (which does not exceed 4 feet in width), 
stairway landings (which do not exceed 6 feet in width or length), or a tram shall 
be allowed to encroach within the buffer. The buffer shall be a minimum of 25 
feet in slope distance from the high water mark of the water body. For purposes 
of this Ordinance, high water marks shall be considered to be the following 
elevations: 
Coeur d'Alene Lake 2125.0 (N.G.Y.D. 1929 datum) .... 2 
A.R. p. 969-70. In Section 4 of that ordinance, "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer" is defined 
as "[a]n area where no development activity has occurred or will occur, including, but not 
limited to, logging, construction of utility trenches, roads, structures, or surface and storm water 
facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural state." A.R. p. 961. The definition of the 
term "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer" and the regulations pertaining to undisturbed 
natural vegetation buffers did not change upon enactment of either Ordinance No. 283 or 
Ordinance No. 374. See A.R. p. 920, 928, 940,949. 
Department staff documented, through testimony and photographs obtained from the 
County Assessor in 200 I and photographs taken by Department staff in 2008, that Stafford 
caused site disturbances to occur, and work to be performed, within the no-disturbance zone 
during the summer of 2001. See A.R. p. 9-27. Stafford admitted as much at the hearings on this 
2 As stated in Appellants' Opening Brief, the ordinary high water mark of Lake Coeur d'Alene of2,125.0' 
(N.G.V.O. 1929 datum) equates to elevation 2,128.0' (WWP/A vista datum). See Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 3 n. 
3; In re Sanders Beach, 143 Idaho 443, 147 P.3d 75 (2006). 
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appeal. See Tr. p. 25-31, 57-70, 75-77; see also Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 5-7,17-18. This 
led to the withholding of a Certificate of Occupancy for an addition as authorized under Section 
13 of the Site Disturbance Ordinance, which states that "[tJhe Administrator may ... withhold 
further issuance of permits" upon citation for a violation of the ordinance. See A.R. p. 113-41. 
Stafford has attempted to argue, however, that because the work occurred in 2001, while 
Ordinance No. 283 was in effect, it should not be enforced as a violation of Ordinance No. 374 
(notwithstanding the identical relevant language). 
What this argument ignores is the fact that the landscaping within the no-disturbance 
zone is an ongoing violation of the Site Disturbance Ordinance in effect at any given time. Each 
ordinance has mandated that a 25-foot "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall be retained at 
the waterfront" on all property fronting Lake Coeur d' Alene. A.R. p. 928, 949, 969 (emphasis 
added). The presence of rock bulkheads, waterfalls, manicured lawns, swales, sand and boulders 
all violate this clear mandate, and do so every day they continue to be present within this no-
disturbance zone, regardless of however aesthetically pleasing these features may be. Therefore, 
it was perfectly lawful and appropriate to cite Stafford for an ongoing violation of this provision 
of the Site Disturbance Ordinance currently in effect, Ordinance No. 374. 
2. The ongoing nature of this violation renders the argument over the meaning of the 
term "supersede" moot. Alternatively, this term should be construed to mean 
"replace" rather than "render null and void." 
Stafford also argues that the Board's determination that the Stafford property was in 
violation of the no-disturbance zone requirement of the Site Disturbance Ordinance was 
improper because the enactment of Ordinance No. 374 "superseded" Ordinance No. 283. As 
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discussed above, however, this ignores the fact that the violation at issue is ongoing in nature. A 
violation of Ordinance No. 283 occurred every day from the time the first disturbance occurred 
in the summer of 2001 until Ordinance No. 374 took effect on December 12, 2005, and a 
violation of Ordinance No. 374 has occurred every day from that date forward. Therefore, this 
issue of the meaning of "supersede" as used in Ordinance No. 374 is moot. 
Even if the Court were to consider the fact that Ordinance No. 374 superseded Ordinance 
No. 283 to be relevant to its decision, the citation for violating the no-disturbance zone 
requirement was proper nevertheless. No Idaho appellate opinion has provided a definitive 
definition for the word "supersede." However, a recent decision of the Montana Supreme Court 
employed the following definition: "Supersede is defined in Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary as '2: to take the place, room, or position of; 3: to displace in favor ofanother.'" Pula 
v. State, 40 P.3d 364, 374 (Mont. 2002).3 This definition more accurately describes the effect of 
the adoption of Ordinance No. 374, as it pertained to the same subject matter and replaced 
Ordinance No. 283 as of its effective date of December 12,2005. 
It is true that from that date forward, Ordinance No. 283 had no further force or effect. 
This does not change the fact that Ordinance No. 283 was in full force and effect until December 
12, 2005, however. Any other interpretation would lead to the absurd result of making conduct 
which was unlawful at the time it occurred suddenly lawful as a nonconforming use. A 
nonconforming use is in fact a use of property which was lawful at the time it was established 
3 See R. p. 108-19. 
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but is not in compliance with ordinance provisions currently in effect. Baxter v. City of Preston, 
115 Idaho 607, 608-09, 768 P.2d 1340, 1341-42 (1989). This "grandfather right" simply 
"protects the owner from abrupt termination of what had been a lawful condition or activity on 
the property" but "does not extend beyond this purpose." Bastian v. City of Twin Falls, 104 
Idaho 307, 309, 658 P.2d 978, 980 (Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added). Thus, the interpretation of 
the effect of the word "supersede" advanced by Stafford would turn the longstanding legal 
principle of nonconforming uses on its head. It would also contravene this Court's previous 
holding that a city or county cannot permit activities which are prohibited under its land use 
ordinances. City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 845-46,136 P.3d 310, 316-17 
(2006). 
Stafford also emphasizes the fact that each Site Disturbance Ordinance provides that 
violations thereof are misdemeanors punishable upon conviction via fine and/or incarceration. 
See A.R. p. 932, 952, 973. While this is true, the emphasis on these potential criminal penalties 
is misplaced. First of all, each of these ordinances is primarily regulatory in nature, in that they 
generally permit conduct subject to the regulations contained therein, as opposed to statutes that 
are primarily penal in nature, which are intended to prohibit conduct. See California v. Cabazon 
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207-12, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 1087-89 (1987) (finding 
California statute was "civil/regulatory" in nature, and therefore not enforceable by the State of 
California or a political subdivision thereof within an Indian reservation under Public Law 280, 
even though it prescribed criminal penalties for violations). Secondly, this argument again 
ignores the plain language of these provisions which states that each day on which a violation 
II 
occurs constitutes a separate offense. See A.R. p. 932, 952, 973. The violation at issue is an 
ongoing violation, not a one-time violation. Finally, these arguments are inapplicable because 
this is not an appeal of a criminal conviction for a violation of the Site Disturbance Ordinance. It 
is instead an appeal of a decision to issue an administrative citation, civil in nature, for that 
violation. Therefore, Stafford's arguments regarding concepts of criminal law such as double 
jeopardy or the ex post/acto application of a law simply do not apply. 4 
In addition, this language must be read in conjunction with Section 1-2-3 of the Kootenai 
County Code, which was adopted via the enactment of Ordinance No. 337, effective as of 
August 30, 2004. This section reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
No new ordinance shall be construed or held to repeal a former ordinance 
whether such former ordinance is expressly repealed or not, as to any offense 
committed against such former ordinance or as to any act done, any penalty, 
forfeiture or punishment so incurred, or any right accrued or claim arising under 
the former ordinance, or in any way whatever to affect any such offense or act so 
committed or so done, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment so incurred or 
any right accrued or claim arising before the new ordinance takes effect.. .. 
K.C.C. § 1-2-3.5 This language specifically provides that an ordinance violation may continue to 
be prosecuted even after a new ordinance is enacted which has the effect of replacing or 
superseding the ordinance in effect at the time of the violation, or even if the new ordinance 
expressly repeals the ordinance previously in effect. Therefore, the discussion of the effect of 
the enactment of Ordinance No. 374 as "superseding" Ordinance No. 283 is of no import. 
4 As the District Court pointed out, the ex post facto argument also fails because the activities in question were not 
"innocent when done," as they were always prohibited under the Site Disturbance Ordinance during the relevant 
time period. R. p. 137-38; see also Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,41-42,110 S.Ct. 2715, 2718-19 (1990). 
5 See R. p. 100-06. 
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Stafford, however, has attempted to argue that the language of Section 1 -2-3 of the 
Kootenai County Code actually supports the argument that the County should have indicated that 
the violation was of Ordinance No. 283, as opposed to Ordinance No. 374. This argument fails 
for two reasons. First, it ignores the plain language of this section, which merely states that an 
action regarding a violation of an ordinance is not extinguished merely by virtue of the 
enactment of a new ordinance, even if the new ordinance repealed the ordinance in effect at the 
time of the violation. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it ignores the fact that the violation 
is ongoing in nature, as opposed to the one-time violation theory advanced by Stafford. 
In summary, the fact that Ordinance No. 374 "superseded" Ordinance No. 283 does not 
excuse Stafford's violation of the Site Disturbance Ordinance because the violation is ongoing in 
nature, because the word "supersede" should be read so as to avoid absurd results, and because 
actions for violation of an ordinance expressly survive the enactment of a new ordinance 
pertaining to the same subject matter, even if the new ordinance repeals (or supersedes) the 
ordinance in effect at the time of the violation. Therefore, this Court should affirm the decision 
of the District Court, which affirmed the decision of the Board in this matter. 
3. The decision of the Board properly applied the language of Section 8(B) of the 
Site Disturbance Ordinance to the facts of this case. 
Stafford also argues that the Board's determination that the Stafford property was in 
violation of the no-disturbance zone requirement of the Site Disturbance Ordinance was 
improper because the Department failed to show that the work performed within the no-
disturbance zone had any significant adverse effects. Stafford also contends that the work 
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actually had a beneficial effect, as it cleaned up the pre-existing slash pile and noxious weeds 
which were present in that area. 
These arguments miss the point, which is that this property is required, and at all relevant 
times has been required, to maintain a 25-foot undisturbed natural vegetation buffer from the 
ordinary high water mark of Lake Coeur d'Alene. This "no-disturbance zone" serves the 
purpose of the Site Disturbance Ordinance by minimizing the risk of erosion, sedimentation and 
runoff (whether from stormwater or human activity) into Kootenai County's lakes, and 
particularly Lake Coeur d' Alene, from whatever source. See A.R. p. 78. 
The facts supporting the finding that Stafford is in violation of this requirement are 
undisputed. It is not necessary to also prove the existence of actual "significant adverse effects" 
in order to cite a property owner for such a violation of any provision of this ordinance, including 
the no-disturbance zone mandate; rather, it is sufficient simply to prove that a violation did in 
fact occur. In illustrating this concept, the District Court made an analogy to a person charged 
with driving under the influence. See R. p. 140-41. In that case, the prosecutor need not prove 
that the defendant "would have caused death or injury on the highway," but instead only needs to 
prove that the defendant "was driving or in control of a vehicle on a highway while impaired." 
See id. 
It may well be that the features placed within the no-disturbance zone make the shoreline 
more aesthetically pleasing than was the case prior to their placement within the no-disturbance 
zone. However, when one looks below the surface, such features in such close proximity to the 
lake are not necessarily beneficial. Added sand quickly washes into the lake, particularly during 
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periods of high water. Lawns typically are watered, and are often fertilized. Thus, the Site 
Disturbance Ordinance requires that storm water treatment occur landward of the no-disturbance 
zone. See A.R. p. 87, 89. Otherwise, nutrients would flow unchecked into the lake. Water 
features such as the one on the Stafford property are not allowed in the no-disturbance zone for 
the same reasons. See A.R. p. 27. Rock walls and boulders also slowly erode over time. The 
Board recognized that what may be aesthetically pleasing is not necessarily beneficial to the 
environment, and thus ordered that the no-disturbance zone be remediated to a more natural state 
as determined by a design professional, as defined in the Site Disturbance Ordinance, in a 
remediation plan approved by the Department. See A.R. p. 79, 623, 626. 
The undisputed evidence shows that there is an ongoing violation of the no-disturbance 
zone mandate of the Site Disturbance Ordinance on the Stafford property, regardless of whether 
this violation has itself caused any "significant adverse effects" on Lake Coeur d'Alene. 
Therefore, the District Court correctly found that the Board had properly applied the language of 
the Site Disturbance Ordinance, which has remained unchanged since the activities at issue 
began, to the facts of this case. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the District Court's 
decision that the Board correctly found that Stafford was properly cited for a violation of the Site 
Disturbance Ordinance. 
II 
II 
II 
II 
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B. The District Court correctly held that the decision of the Kootenai County Board of 
Commissioners in Case No. APP08-0002 was supported by substantial evidence in 
the record as a whole, and was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of the Board's 
discretion. 
1. The decision of the Board was supported by substantial, undisputed evidence in 
the record. 
This Court has defined "substantial evidence" as "relevant evidence which a reasonable 
mind might accept to support a conclusion." Lamar Corp v. City of Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 
42-43, 981 P .2d 1146, 1152-53 (1999). It is "less than a preponderance of evidence, but more 
than a mere scintilla." Cowan v. Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 517, 148 P.3d 1247, 1263 
(2006). Substantial evidence "need not be uncontradicted, nor does it need to necessarily lead to 
a certain conclusion; it need only be of such sufficient quantity and probative value that 
reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the fact finder." Id. 
As discussed above, the undisputed evidence in the record shows that a violation of the 
no-disturbance zone mandate of the Site Disturbance Ordinance currently exists on the Stafford 
property. Therefore, the District Court correctly found that the Board's decision that the 
Department had properly issued a citation to Stafford for violating the Site Disturbance 
Ordinance was based on substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 
2. The decision of the Board was neither arbitrary nor capricious. 
A decision of a governing board will be considered "arbitrary and capricious," and an 
abuse of the governing board's discretion, only if it was made "without a rational basis, or in 
disregard of the facts and circumstances, or without adequate determining principles." Lane 
Ranch Partnership v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 91,175 P.3d 776, 780 (2007). As long as 
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the governing board has been found to have acted within the bounds of its discretion, however, a 
reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the governing board. ld. Where 
reasonable minds may differ, "an action is not arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly 
and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has 
been reached." Enterprise, Inc. v. City a/Nampa, 96 Idaho 734, 739, 536 P.2d 729, 734 (1975). 
As discussed above, the Board took the facts and circumstances set forth in the 
undisputed evidence into account in making the decision that a violation of the no-disturbance 
zone requirement of the Site Disturbance Ordinance did occur and does currently exist on the 
Stafford property, and that the Department properly cited Stafford for that violation. This 
decision thus had a rational basis and was based on adequate determining principles. Therefore, 
the District Court correctly found that the Board's decision that the Department had properly 
issued a citation to Stafford for violating the Site Disturbance Ordinance was not arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of the Board's discretion. 
C. The District Court correctly held that the County was not estopped from citing 
Stafford for a violation of the Site Disturbance Ordinance. 
Stafford correctly notes that the doctrine of estoppel is generally not applied against 
governmental entities, and also correctly states that this Court has refused to impose an absolute 
bar on the application of estoppel against governmental entities, particularly if the entity is acting 
in a proprietary or business capacity. See Murtaugh Hwy. Dist. v. Twin Falls Hwy. Dist., 65 
Idaho 260, 142 P.2d 579, 582 (1943). The doctrine of estoppel, however, is strongly disfavored 
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in cases involving a governmental entity acting in a governmental or discretionary capacity, as is 
the case when it is acting to enforce duly enacted land use ordinances. 
In Harrell v. City o.lLewiston, 95 Idaho 243, 506 P.2d 470 (1973), this Court discussed 
the history of its prior decisions regarding the application of estoppel against governmental 
entities, and also discussed the fact that some jurisdictions had refused to do so in any 
circumstance concerning the enactment or enforcement of zoning regulations, while other 
jurisdictions would do so only under "extraordinary circumstances." Harrell, 95 Idaho at 247-
48,506 P.2d at 474-75. The Harrell Court then adopted the "extraordinary circumstances" rule, 
and found that no exigency existed such as would estop the City of Lewiston from refusing to 
issue a building permit on the basis that the property at issue was zoned F (Farm) rather than C-3 
(Commercial). 
A later decision of this Court concerned whether a rezoning of property in 1993 which 
was the subject of a development agreement originally entered into in 1973 constituted a 
violation of that agreement. Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc. v. City of Hailey, 127 Idaho 
576, 578-80, 903 P.2d 741, 743-45 (1995). In that case, the City of Hailey conceded that the 
property owner's predecessor in interest had fulfilled the terms and conditions of the agreement. 
ld. at 579, 903 P.2d at 744. The then-current property owner had contended that the City of 
Hailey should have been estopped from changing its position as to its obligations under the 
development agreement, since the City had "received the benefit of its bargain." ld. at 582-83, 
903 P.2d at 747-48. The Sprenger Court, however, found that the application of estoppel was 
not appropriate because the City did not breach the agreement, the agreement did not impose a 
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"regulatory freeze" on the property in question, and the property owner did not rely to its 
detriment on the prior zoning as opposed to the new zoning. Id. at 582-83, 903 P.2d at 747-48. 
Most recently, this Court has had occasion to extend the rule from Harrell and Sprenger 
to a case involving a subdivision application. Terrazas v. Blaine County, 147 Idaho 193, 198-
201, 207 P.3d 169, 174-77 (2009). In that case, the property owners had applied for preliminary 
subdivision approval based on planning staff's interpretation that the property in question did not 
lie within Blaine County's "Mountain Overlay District" (MOD). Id. at 196-97, 207 P .3d at 172-
73. They had contended that because they had relied on this interpretation to their detriment in 
the form of expenditures of large sums of money in preparing the subdivision application, the 
county should be estopped from denying the application on the basis that the property was within 
the MOD. !d. at 200, 207 P.3d at 176. This Court, however, once again declined to apply the 
doctrine of estoppel in this matter, expressly finding that to do so would "strip the [governing] 
boards of their sole statutory authority to approve or deny subdivision applications." Jd. at 200-
01,207 P.3d at 176-77. 
In this case, the police power being exercised by the County is the power to enforce its 
duly enacted ordinances - in particular, the Site Disturbance Ordinance. Therefore, this Court 
should find that the cases which strongly disfavor the application of estoppel against a 
governmental entity acting in a governmental capacity are on point in deciding this case. 
Here, Stafford places much emphasis on the fact that an unnamed Department employee 
told Dr. Stafford that "re-greening is not a problem." See Tr. p. 66. Although "re-greening" 
could be (and is properly) construed to mean planting native vegetation, Dr. Stafford apparently 
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took this to mean he could plant what eventually became a manicured lawn within the no-
disturbance zone. This could perhaps be. chalked up as a misunderstanding, a 
miscommunication, or perhaps even an honest error in stating what would be an acceptable 
remediation of a no-disturbance zone. Stafford, however, went far beyond this, committing an 
even more egregious violation of the no-disturbance zone requirement by placing such features 
as a rock bulkhead, a water feature flowing directly into the lake, additional sand, and basalt 
boulders within this area. While the County did issue a site disturbance permit in conjunction 
with the building permit for the addition, this permit did not authorize either then-existing or 
future disturbances in the no-disturbance zone. 
Terrazas confirmed once and for all that the Board is the final arbiter of how its land use 
ordinances should be interpreted, and that such pronouncements govern over contrary 
interpretations made by Department staff. See Terrazas, 147 Idaho at 198-201,207 P.3d at 174-
77. Thus, misunderstood or erroneous advice given by a Department staff member or a site 
inspection which does not immediately lead to a citation for an ordinance violation cannot be 
used as a basis to estop the County from taking action to enforce its land use ordinances. 
Accordingly, there was no false representation, concealment of fact, or change in position such 
as would trigger the application of estoppel or quasi-estoppel in this case. See Williams v. 
Blakely, 114 Idaho 323, 325, 757 P.2d 186, 188 (1987); Allen, 145 Idaho at 812, 186 P.3d at 668. 
The only potential basis for the application of either doctrine was addressed by the Board 
when it decided to allow the barbeque pit to remain, notwithstanding the fact that it was partially 
within the no-disturbance zone, since it was depicted as straddling the no-disturbance zone 
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boundary in the site plan approved by the Department. Otherwise, the violation of the no-
disturbance zone requirement was the direct result of actions taken by Stafford, and it is 
Stafford's responsibility to remediate it to a more natural state. Therefore, this Court should 
affirm the District Court's finding that the Board should not be estopped from enforcing the no-
disturbance zone regulations contained in the Site Disturbance Ordinance in this case. 
D. No substantial rights of Stafford were prejudiced by the decision of the Kootenai 
County Board of Commissioners in Case No. APP08-0002. 
Even if a decision of a governing board made under LLUP A is found to have violated 
one or more provisions of Idaho Code §67-5279, the decision must nevertheless be affirmed 
unless substantial rights of the aggrieved party were prejudiced by the decision. Noble v. 
Kootenai County, 148 Idaho 937, 943, 231 P. 3d 1034, 1040 (2010) (decision denying 
subdivision application affirmed notwithstanding finding that decision was made upon unlawful 
procedure). Here, no substantial rights of Stafford have been prejudiced because Stafford does 
not have the right to maintain the subject property in a condition constituting an ongoing 
violation of a provision of the Site Disturbance O,rdinance which has not materially changed 
since the violation first occurred. In addition, Stafford was afforded due process throughout the 
administrative appeal and District Court appeal process, including the identification of an 
appropriate remedy for the violation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The undisputed facts show that since 2001, the Stafford property has been, and continues 
to be, in clear violation of the Kootenai County Site Disturbance Ordinance in effect at any given 
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time. Thus, the Board's finding to that effect is supported by substantial evidence if the record 
and is neither arbitrary nor capricious. In addition, this Court should decline Stafford's invitation 
to twist the nonconforming use and ex post facto doctrines and the word "supersede" in a manner 
which would effectively excuse ongoing conduct which was unlawful at the time it began and 
has consistently remained unlawful to this day. Finally, the Court should not apply the doctrine 
of estoppel in this case so as to proscribe the County from enforcing a prohibition of activities 
occurring within the no-disturbance zone which it had never permitted. 
Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the decision of the District Court affirming the 
decision of the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners in Case No. APP08-0002 should be 
AFFIRMED, and the County should be awarded its costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40. 
Dated this Zl.fh day of July, 2010. 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
Patrick M. Braden, Civil Deputy 
Attorney for Respondents 
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